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Abstract
Oblivious transfer protocols (R-OT and OT21) are presented based on non-
orthogonal states transmission, and the bit commitment protocols on the top
of OT21 are constructed. Although these OT protocols are all unconditional
secure, the bit commitment protocols based on OT protocols are not secure
against attack similar to that presented by no-go theorem.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, oblivious transfer, bit commitment,
physical security of protocol
No-go theorem [1, 2] declares that there is no quantum bit commitment
protocol with unconditional security in both binding and concealing. Here we
consider the construction of oblivious transfer and bit commitment protocols
based on two non-orthogonal quantum states transmission, as that in [3, 4].
Although the OT protocols and the construction from OT to BC are uncon-
ditionally secure, the BC protocols we finally have are not unconditionally
secure ones. Then, we encounter a thought-provoking problem.
1. Quantum random oblivious transfer
Definition 1. (Random Oblivious Transfer (R-OT) Channel)
Alice sends a random bit r to Bob via a channel, if
1. Bob obtains the bit value r with a probability p satisfies 0 < β < p < α,
α < 1
2
, α and β are any two real numbers;
2. Alice cannot know whether Bob has get the value of her bit.
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Then, the channel is named a R-OT channel (an extended Rabin’s OT chan-
nel).
Let two quantum states |Ψ0〉, |Ψ1〉 satisfy 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉 = cos θ, we can
distinguish them with probability p = 1 − cos θ, by some POVM process,
which is the optimal result. Here after we choose θ = pi
4
, then the opti-
mal scheme to distinguish |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 will be of a success probability
p = 1 −
√
2
2
. To simplify the protocol to be a practical one, we choose an
easy way of measurement: the receiver Bob randomly chooses one of the
two bases, B0 = {|Ψ0〉, |Ψ0〉⊥} and B1 = {|Ψ1〉, |Ψ1〉⊥}, as his measurement
bases. When his measurement results in |Ψx〉⊥, Bob admits |Ψx⊕1〉 as that
comes from Alice; otherwise, he concludes no result.
In this case, Bob’s probability of conclusive bits is 1
2
cos2 pi
4
= 1
4
. We put
forward a quantum R-OT protocol as follows:
Protocol 1. Quantum R-OT
1. Alice generates random bit string (r1, . . . , rn), and sends |Ψr1〉, . . . , |Ψrn〉
to Bob.
2. Bob chooses B1 or B2 randomly to measure the qubit string coming from
Alice. He accepts a bit as a conclusive bit if and only if his measurement
results in state |Ψx〉⊥, and takes the value of this bit as x⊕ 1.
It can be seen that an honest Bob will get about 1
4
n conclusive bits,
though a malicious Bob can get up to (1−
√
2
2
)n conclusive bits with general
individual attack. If Alice can get a bit’s value and ensure that it is a
conclusive bit, the qubit Bob obtained must be in a pure state. Therefore,
Alice cannot execute EPR attack, and then, she cannot know whether a bit
with a given value has been taken as a conclusive bit by Bob.
2. One-out-of-two oblivious transfer(OT21)
Let us construct an OT21 protocol based on protocol 1. The construction of
OT21 on top of R-OT is proposed firstly by Cre´peau [7] in 1988. For parameter
α = 1
16
, we have k ≡ b(1
4
− α)nc = b 3
16
nc, b3
8
nc − 1 ≤ 2k ≤ b3
8
nc. Suppose
the probability of the cases that the number of conclusive bits obtained by
an honest Bob is more than k be p1, and the probability of the cases that the
number of conclusive bits obtained by a malicious Bob is equal to or greater
than 2k be p2.
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Protocol 2. (OT21)
1. After executing protocol 1 with Alice, Bob chooses k bits ri1 , . . . , rik from
his conclusive bits, and define I ≡ {i1, . . . , ik}; then he choose randomly
k bits rj1 , . . . , rjk from set {1, . . . , n}\I, and define J ≡ {j1, . . . , jk}.
2. Bob sends {X, Y } to Alice, chooses randomly {X, Y } = {I, J} or
{X, Y } = {J, I} according to his random bit with value m.
3. After receiving (X, Y ), Alice computes:
s0 = ⊕
i∈X
ri, s1 = ⊕
i∈Y
ri
then encrypts her messages b0 and b1 as
c0 = b0 ⊕ s0, c1 = b1 ⊕ s1,
and sends them to Bob.
4. Bob computes s =
⊕
i∈I ri, and decrypts that coming from Alice to
obtain either b0 or b1.
It is obvious that the above protocol is a secure OT21 protocol if and only if
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. p1 → 1 exponentially as n→∞.
2. p2 → 0 exponentially as n→∞.
We can easily find that these conditions really holds as α = 1
16
.
3. Bit commitment protocol
The entanglement state is needed in the attack on quantum bit commit-
ment protocol according to no-go theorem. Consider of the famous averment
of resisting entanglement with entanglement, as used in the construction of
quantum error-correcting codes, we present a bit commitment protocol as
follows:
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Protocol 3. (Bit commitment)
Commit phase:
1. Bob prepares quantum state |Φ−1 〉, ..., |Φ−n 〉,
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉I |0〉II − |1〉I |1〉II). (1)
and sends each first qubit of every pair to Alice.
2. Alice generates random bit string (r1, . . . , rn). When ri = 0, she keeps
the ith qubit unchanged and sends it back to Bob; when ri = 1, she ro-
tates the state along y axis (not Hadamard transformation) with trans-
formation U = Ry(−pi2 ), where Ry(−pi2 ) = ei
pi
4
Y , and sends the qubit
back to Bob, that is
ri = 0, |Φ−〉 −→ |Φ−〉,
ri = 1, |Φ−〉 −→ 1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ |Ψ+〉)
since
1√
2
(ei
pi
4
Y |0〉I ⊗ |0〉II − eipi4 Y |1〉I ⊗ |1〉II)
=
1√
2
(|+〉I |0〉II + |−〉I |1〉II)
=
1
2
[(|0〉I |0〉II − |1〉I |1〉II) + (|1〉I |0〉II + |0〉I |1〉II)]
=
1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ |Ψ+〉).
3. Bob chooses B0 or B1 randomly to measure the qubit string coming
from Alice, bases
B0 =
{|Φ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |Ψ+〉}
B1 =
{
1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ |Ψ+〉), 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − |Ψ+〉), 1√
2
(|Φ+〉+ |Ψ−〉), 1√
2
(|Φ+〉+ |Ψ−〉)
}
He accepts a bit as a conclusive bit if and only if his measurement
results in states |Ψ+〉 or 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − |Ψ+〉). When it results in |Ψ+〉,
he takes the value of this bit as 1; when it results in 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − |Ψ+〉),
he takes the value of this bit as 0. It can be seen the probability of a
conclusive bit is 1
4
.
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4. Bob chooses k bits ri1 , . . . , rik from his conclusive bits, where k =
3
16
n
and define I ≡ {i1, . . . , ik}; then he chooses B1 or B2 randomly to
measure the qubit string coming from Alice. He choose randomly k bits
rj1 , . . . , rjk from set {1, . . . , n}\I, and define J ≡ {j1, . . . , jk}. He sends
{X, Y } to Alice, chooses randomly {X, Y } = {I, J} or {X, Y } = {J, I}
according to his random bit with value m.
5. After receiving (X, Y ), Alice computes:
s0 = ⊕
i∈X
ri, s1 = ⊕
i∈Y
ri
then encrypts her messages b0 and b1 as
c0 = b0 ⊕ s0, c1 = b1 ⊕ s1,
and sends them to Bob.
6. Bob computes s =
⊕
i∈I ri, and decrypts that coming from Alice to
obtain either b0 or b1.
7. Alice divides randomly her commit value as b = b
(i)
0 ⊕ b(i)1 , i = 1, . . . , l
and executes Step 1 − 6 with Bob l times for sending {b(i)0 , b(i)1 |i =
1, ..., l}.
Open phase:
1. Alice opens {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i = 1, . . . l}..
2. Bob verifies whether {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i = 1, . . . l}
is consistent with his {b(i)mi ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
|i = 1, . . . l} and those conclu-
sive bits in J. If the consistency holds, he admits Alice’s commit value
as b.
4. Analysis on security
4.1. The security of bit commitment protocol based on Protocol 2
From Protocol 2, Bob can obtain either b0 or b1. Alice divides randomly
her commit value as b = b
(i)
0 ⊕ b(i)1 , i = 1, . . . , l and executes Protocol 2 with
Bob l times for sending {b(i)0 , b(i)1 |i = 1, ..., l}, then a bit commitment protocol
is constructed.
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This bit commitment protocol can be attacked according to no-go theo-
rem. When Alice commits 0 or 1, she prepares
|0〉 =
2k∑
i=1
αi|ei〉A ⊗ |Ψri〉B,
|1〉 =
2k∑
j=1
βj|e′j〉A ⊗ |Ψrj〉B,
(2)
respectively, where
2k⊕
i=1
ri = c0 ⊕ c1,
2k⊕
j=1
rj = c0 ⊕ c1 ⊕ 1,
(3)
Define |φ0〉, |φ1〉 are two pure states on the composite system, and ρB0 =
Tr(|φ0〉〈φ0|), ρB1 = Tr(|φ1〉〈φ1|). The fidelity of the two density matrices is
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = max|〈φ0|φ1〉| (4)
From Equation (2) (3), it can be seen that Bob can distinguish the two
density matrices with a small probability.
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1− δ (5)
where δ > 0 is small. If Alice wants to change the value of commitment 0 to
1, she can apply a unitary transformation acting on A alone to obtain |φ0〉,
which satisfies
|〈φ0|1〉| = F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) = 1− δ (6)
As |φ0〉 and |1〉 are so similar, Bob hardly can detect the cheating Alice.
4.2. The security of bit commitment protocol based on a modified protocol of
Protocol 2
We modify Step 3 and Step 4 of Protocol 2 as follows:
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1. After receiving (X, Y ), Alice encrypts her messages b0 and b1 as{
c0 = E(rx1 ,...,rxk )(R0, b0) ∈ {0, 1}k+1, {x1, ...xk} = X,
c1 = E(ry1 ,...,ryk )(R1, b1) ∈ {0, 1}k+1, {y1, ...yk} = Y,
where x, y are the encryption keys, R0, R1 ∈ {0, 1}k are Alice’s local
random bit-string. Alice sends c0, c1 to Bob and keeps R0, R1 secret.
2. Bob decrypts that coming from Alice Dkey(cm) to obtain (Rm, bm) =
Dkey(cm) with key = (ri1 , ..., rik).
Alice divides randomly her commit value as b = b
(i)
0 ⊕ b(i)1 , i = 1, . . . , l and
executes the OT 21 with Bob l times for sending {b(i)0 , b(i)1 |i = 1, ..., l}, then
another bit commitment protocol is constructed. In open phase of the bit
commitment, the value of R0 and R1 should be opened to limit a cheating
Alice.
Then we analyze whether R0 and R1 can limit Alice to apply a unitary
transformation and not to be detected by Bob. Suppose
(Q0(rx1 , ..., rxk)⊕Q1(ry1 , ..., ryk), d0(rx1 , ..., rxk)⊕ d1(ry1 , ..., ryk))
=(D(rx1 ,...,rxk )(R0)⊕D(ry1 ,...,ryk )(R1), D(rx1 ,...,rxk )(b0)⊕D(ry1 ,...,ryk )(b1))
=(R0 ⊕R1, b0 ⊕ b1).
(7)
Generally, if Alice tries to apply a unitary transformation acting on A, the
change of d0(rx1 , ..., rxk)⊕ d1(ry1 , ..., ryk) could not be detected by Bob. As-
sume {X, Y } = {I, J} and Bob does not know the value of {ryi , ..., ryk}. As
long as Alice applies this unitary transformation, she can get the value of
{rx1 , ..., rxk , ry1 , ..., ry(i−1) , ry′i , ..., ry′k}, which allows Alice computes
Q0(rx1 , ..., rxk)⊕Q1(ry1 , ..., ry(i−1) , ry′i , ..., ry′k) = (R0 ⊕R′1). (8)
The value of R0 is consistent with that Bob obtains and the change of R1
can not be detected by Bob. Alice can always cheat successfully.
It is interesting that the quantum OT21 protocols are secure but the bit
commitment based on them can be attacked according to no-go theorem.
However, in classical cryptography, the bit commitment protocol on the top
of a secure OT21 protocol is secure if only the construction is secure. This
interesting results remaind us that the composable security of quantum pro-
tocols is worth to be investigated theoretically.
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4.3. The security of Protocol 3
As Alice attacks according to no-go theorem, she may make her probe
qubit entangled with that comes from Bob. Suppose the state has been
changed to 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉BI |0〉BII − |1〉A|1〉BI |1〉BII). For ri = 1, the state be-
comes
1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗ eipi4 y|0〉BI ⊗ |0〉BII − |1〉Aeipi4 y|1〉BI ⊗ |1〉BII)
=
1√
2
(|0〉A|+〉BI |0〉BII + |1〉A|−〉BI |1〉BII)
=
1
2
(|0〉A|0〉BI |0〉BII + |0〉A|1〉BI |0〉BII + |1〉A|0〉BI |1〉BII − |1〉A|1〉BI |1〉BII)
=
1
2
(|+〉A|Φ−〉B + |−〉A|Φ+〉B + |+〉A|Ψ+〉B + |−〉A|Ψ−〉B) ,
(9)
For ri = 0, the state becomes
1√
2
(|0〉III |0〉I |0〉II − |1〉III |1〉I |1〉II)
=
1
2
[|0〉III(|Φ−〉I,II + |Φ+〉I,II)− |1〉III(|Φ+〉I,II − |Φ−〉I,II)] (10)
Suppose Bob randomly chooses B0 and B1 to measure the two states.
When he chooses B0 to measure the state in the end of Equation (9), the
probability that the measurement results in |Φ−〉, |Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |Ψ+〉 is 1
4
,
respectively. Since |Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉 is the result that should not exist without Al-
ice’s attack, Bob can recognize Alice’s attack with a probability 1
2
. Similarly,
the probability of recognizing the attack of Alice in the other three cases is
1
2
. Since there is n qubits transmitted, the probability of Alice’s successful
attack is 1
2n
. Thus, this no-go theorem type attack can not work.
However, there is a better attack. The entangled state prepared by Bob
can be regarded as |ψB〉 =
∑
i,j αij|φi〉BI |φj〉BII . Then he sends the first
register to Alice. Alice dose a controlled unitary transformation instead of
8
the protocol operation.
|ψ〉 = 1
n
∑
rk
|r1, ..., rn〉AUBI(r1, ..., rn)
n⊗
i=1
|Φ−i 〉B
=
1
n
∑
rk
|r1, ..., rn〉AUBI(r1, ..., rn)
∑
i,j
αij|φi〉BI |φj〉BII
=
1
n
∑
rk,i,j
αij|r1, ..., rn〉A [UBI(r1)⊗ ...⊗ UBI(rn)] |φi〉BI |φj〉BII
=
1
n
∑
rk,i,j
αij|r1, ..., rn〉A
[
UBI(r1)|φ1i 〉BI
]⊗ ...⊗ [UBI(rn)|φni 〉BI ] |φj〉BII
=
1
n
∑
rk,i,j
αij|r1, ..., rn〉A|φ1′i 〉BI ⊗ ...⊗ |φn
′
i 〉BI |φj〉BII
=
∑
rk,i,j
α′ijk|rk〉A ⊗ |φ′i〉BI ⊗ |φj〉BII (11)
It is easy to see that the control qubits in Alice’s hands are entangled with
Bob’s registers. When Alice commits 0, the whole state is
|0〉 =
∑
i,j,rv
αijv|rv〉A ⊗ |φ′i〉BI ⊗ |φj〉BII , (12)
where
⊕2k
v=1 rv = c0 ⊕ c1. When Alice commits 1, the whole state is
|1〉 =
∑
i,j,ru
αiju|ru〉A ⊗ |φ′i〉BI ⊗ |φj〉BII , (13)
where
⊕2k
u=1 ru = c0 ⊕ c1 ⊕ 1.
Imagine a system A attached to Bob’s system BI and BII. There are
many pure states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 on the composite system such that ρB0 =
TrA(|ψ0〉〈ψ0|), ρB1 = TrA(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|). Bob can distinguish the two density
matrices with a small probability.
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1− δ (14)
where δ > 0 is small. If Alice wants to change the value of commitment 0 to
1, she can apply a unitary transformation acting on A alone to obtain |ψ0〉,
which satisfies
|〈ψ0|1〉| = F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) = 1− δ (15)
As |ψ0〉 and |1〉 are so similar, Bob hardly can detect the cheating Alice.
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5. Improvement of the bit commitment
5.1. Improvement of Protocol 3
In Step 1 of the bit commitment, Bob rotates the first qubit along y axis
with a random degree α before sending it to Alice, that is |0〉I −→ |α〉I ,|1〉I −→ |α + pi
2
〉I
Since both Bob’s rotation in Step 1 and Alice’s rotation in Step 2 are
along y axis, the two unitary transformations are exchangeable. For Bob, he
rotates the qubit coming from Alice along y axis with −α and executes the
remaining part of the bit commitment. The correctness of the protocol can
also be ensured. For Alice, the attack mentioned in Section 4.3 also works.
5.2. A more simple bit commitment protocol
Here is a more simple and practical bit commitment protocol.
Protocol 4.
Commit phase:
1. Bob prepares a random qubit string |α1〉, ..., |αn〉 and sends it to Alice.
Each secret random value αi represents the angle between the state |αi〉
and the state |0〉 along y axis.
2. Alice generates random bit string (r1, . . . , rn). When ri = 0, she keeps
the ith qubit unchanged and sends it back to Bob; when ri = 1, she ro-
tates the state along y axis (not Hadamard transformation) with trans-
formation U = Ry(−pi2 ), where Ry(−pi2 ) = ei
pi
4
Y , and sends the qubit
back to Bob, that is  ri = 0, |α〉 −→ |α〉,ri = 1, |α〉 −→ |α + pi
4
〉
3. For each qubit coming from Alice, Bob rotates the ith qubit along y axis
with −αi and chooses B0 or B1 randomly to measure, bases
B0 = {|0〉, |1〉}
B1 = {|+〉, |−〉}
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He accepts a bit as a conclusive bit if and only if his measurement
results in states |1〉 or |−〉. When it results in |1〉, he takes the value
of this bit as 1; when it results in |−〉, he takes the value of this bit as
0. It can be seen the probability of a conclusive bit is 1
4
.
4. Bob chooses k bits ri1 , . . . , rik from his conclusive bits, where k =
3
16
n
and define I ≡ {i1, . . . , ik}; then he chooses B1 or B2 randomly to
measure the qubit string coming from Alice. He choose randomly k bits
rj1 , . . . , rjk from set {1, . . . , n}\I, and define J ≡ {j1, . . . , jk}. He sends
{X, Y } to Alice, chooses randomly {X, Y } = {I, J} or {X, Y } = {J, I}
according to his random bit with value m.
5. After receiving (X, Y ), Alice computes:
s0 = ⊕
i∈X
ri, s1 = ⊕
i∈Y
ri
then encrypts her messages b0 and b1 as
c0 = b0 ⊕ s0, c1 = b1 ⊕ s1,
and sends them to Bob.
6. Bob computes s =
⊕
i∈I ri, and decrypts that coming from Alice to
obtain either b0 or b1.
7. Alice divides randomly her commit value as b = b
(i)
0 ⊕ b(i)1 , i = 1, . . . , l
and executes Step 1 − 6 with Bob l times for sending {b(i)0 , b(i)1 |i =
1, ..., l}.
Open phase:
1. Alice opens {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i = 1, . . . l}..
2. Bob verifies whether {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i = 1, . . . l}
is consistent with his {b(i)mi ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
|i = 1, . . . l} and those conclu-
sive bits in J. If the consistency holds, he admits Alice’s commit value
as b.
Suppose the committer has an ideal single-photon source, the quantum
channel is a perfect channel without loss or error and the receiver has two per-
fect single-photon detectors, there is a more simple bit commitment protocol
constructed directly as follows:
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Protocol 5.
Commit phase:
1. Bob prepares a random qubit string |α(1)1 〉, ..., |α(1)n 〉, ......, |α(m)1 〉, ..., |α(m)n 〉
and sends it to Alice. Each secret random value α
(i)
j represents the angle
between the state |α(i)j 〉 and the state |0〉 along y axis.
2. Alice chooses r(i) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, here i = 1, 2, ...,m, r(i) = (r(i)1 , r(i)2 ,
..., r
(i)
n ) satisfies F (r(i)) = b, where F (·) is an nth0 -order correlation im-
mune Boolean function. When r
(i)
j = 0, she keeps the (n× j − n+ i)th
qubit unchanged and sends it back to Bob; when r
(i)
j = 1, she rotates the
state along y axis (not Hadamard transformation) with transformation
U = Ry(−pi2 ), where Ry(−pi2 ) = ei
pi
4
Y , and sends the qubit back to Bob
as a piece of evidence for her commitment, that is r
(i)
j = 0, |α〉 −→ |α〉,
r
(i)
j = 1, |α〉 −→ |α +
pi
4
〉
Open phase:
1. Alice opens by declaring b and the values of r(i).
2. Bob verifies by corresponding projective measurement: if r
(i)
j = 0, Bob
rotates the (n× j−n+ i)th qubit along y axis with −αi and chooses B0
or B1 randomly to measure, bases
B0 = {|0〉, |1〉}
B1 = {|+〉, |−〉}
Unless each results is matched, Bob has to break off the scheme.
3. Bob checks commitment value b. If r(i) satisfies b = F (r(i)) for every i,
Bob accepts the commitment value.
Quantum memory is not necessary in Protocol 5 if Bob’s measurement is
executed in commit phase. Unless Bob uses two perfect single-photon detec-
tors, Alice can attack the binding of the protocol by omitting one qubit in
each n-qubit-string. This is the reason that we can not develop this protocol
to be a practical one.
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6. Discussion
Though these protocols are insecure theoretically, the attacks can hardly
be applied in practice for two reasons: 1) Such as 2k = 200, the entry number
of matrix UA is 2
200× 2200, which is greater than the number of atoms of the
earth (approximately 1050). It means Alice cannot get the matrix actually. 2)
The storage time of quantum state is limited. The bit commitment protocol
can be executed after a period of time to prevent Alice executing her local
unitary transformation with the quantum states in her hands. Define the
protocols which cannot attack by these reasons are physically secure.
In this paper, we present R-OT and OT21 protocols and several bit com-
mitment protocols on the top of OT21. The quantum bit commitment pro-
tocols we proposed are not beyond no-go theorem, but they are physically
secure.
I would like to thank Ya-Qi Song, Guang-Ping He, Chong Xiang and
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